

## Toward an Ontosystemic Anthropology

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This paper intends to be an outline of a theoretical and programmatic response to the widespread, uneasy consideration that Anthropology as an established social science as well as a dynamic field of conversation (and debate) concerning humankind is in a theoretical and practical quandary, if not a veritable breakdown. Signs of this malaise are everywhere and they all converge to a misconstrued sense of putting in doubt the very basic purposes and meanings of the discipline: doubting the intellectual and practical role of the ethnographer, doubting the legitimacy of its methodology, doubting the possibility of knowledge itself, doubting the value of all and every theory, in short, doubting the very doubting, that is, double doubting<sup>1</sup>. In consequence, this kind of Anthropology, the Anthropology of Double-Doubt, which has gained notoriety and power in the United States over the last 20 years, has moved the bulk, if not the scope, of the discipline toward an intellectual abyss where every proposition is leveled down by default and where the only source of intellectual legitimacy lies within the realm of the political. Truth belongs to the strongest. Power is knowledge and knowledge is a function of power.

The authors of this paper, two anthropologists and one philosopher, all born and raised in Brazil but educated also in England and the United States, all with experience in working with several acknowledged themes of Anthropology, share a strong displeasure with this present state of the art of Anthropology. Besides the many issues relating to knowledge which will be discussed in this paper, we feel that this state of being represents, by covering it up as a smokescreen, the present state of hegemonic political power of the United States where, all others made equal by realpolitik and by general rights of purported sovereignty, only one power stands as the legitimate gendarme of the world, and where only one standard

The circumstance is pushing U.S. and it is unable to raise by reason text of a anti-anthropologist.

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culture stands out as the legitimate torch carrier of humanity. Worse yet, the present state of Anthropology represents the point where data, theory, and knowledge have been incorporated into an ossified system that no longer claims to ask the unasked questions and answer the unanswerable, but instead placates its self-doubts with repetition and style. To borrow an archaeological metaphor, it is as if this kind of Anthropology has reached a plateau such that, as with ceramic styles in mature traditions, it only embellishes that which has become standardized. Nonetheless, the metaphor does not account for the fact that this embellishment is realized also to avoid the ugly and to shun the inconvenient that still prop up as unexpected intrusions.

Therefore, though this is an intellectual paper we felt it should start out with a basic political criticism: that the present hegemonic force behind Anthropology as a social science acts not only for its own corporate purposes and objectives but also, inadvertently or purposively, as a tool in justifying and preserving the hegemonic power of the United States and the hegemonic spread of its culture all over the world. Within the United States itself it serves as the legitimator of the power status groups over the mainstream of American social life. Other anthropological traditions of important Western countries such as England and France have either given up on their original purposes for shortness of breath and have submitted to following suit like lemmings charmed by Peterpipe or grunt their displeasure to themselves and stay quiet awaiting the storm pass. Inasmuch as most of their intellectual production compares in theme and argumentation to the prevailing one in the United States they conform to that general state of the art of Anthropology. Even their out-of-the-mainstream members - those that have stuck to the traditional themes and methods derived from their intellectual predecessors, and are thus derided as reactionaries or old-fashioned - are proportionate to the traditionalists found in the United States. For these considerations we take it that Anthropology as an academic social science seems to be divided in two sides, wherein the main force is represented by the Anthropology of Double-Doubt, or post-modernist Anthropology, while the other side comprises varied schools marginally struggling to stay alive.

Before proceeding to an ample analysis of the constitutive themes and theories at work in Anthropology, including the main varieties in action today, we should say that the

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present situation is the outcome not only of a political state of affairs, but also, and for our purposes most importantly, due to questions relating to the intellectual development of the discipline. It is to these questions that we turn our full attention from here on.

First of all, we propose that the present state of art of Anthropology is due to a series of intellectual reasons. One derives from the shortcomings of each and every one of the theories that have constituted its scope. That will be detailed further down. A second reason comes from a series of inappropriate steps and shortcuts taken in the past, mainly the habit of dropping out a theme because the early answers to it had momentarily satisfied and eased the minds of the discussants, not because the theme had been fully worked out. The habit of dropping a theme out of discussion is not of course a characteristic only of Anthropology, but it certainly is well defined and recognized here. This was the case of such themes as primitive man, child rearing, social egalitarianism, and many others. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the present predicament is due to the vicissitudes and changes of the main perceived object of Anthropology - Man, but mainly "primitive man", early man, "pure man", in short, "le bon sauvage", of Rousseau. That man and all their cultures were once seen as in the way to extinction; as they pulled out of this predication a new world was recreated and anthropologists found themselves unable to deal with that, as we still do today.

The analysis of these questions will take up part of this paper. But once it is done we will proceed to put forward new arguments that will help sketch the outlines of a new theory of anthropology, one that is purported to supersede, by subsuming, the previous ones. That theory we are naming ontosystemic anthropology.

### **Anthropology as a social science and as a field of conversation**

As a social science Anthropology is constrained by the rigors of the scientific method which itself as a system can only respond positively to that which is asked, according to how the question is formulated. That is, it responds to a certain subject and to the qualities and attributes that it carries. Therefore as that subject - man and culture - seemingly loses integrity, clarity of contour, purpose, in short, substance, Anthropology as a social science finds itself hanging out loosely in the air as the wall painter whose ladder has been pulled out from under him. Consequently, whatever the theory be, the subject is unclear. Furthermore, as

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the theory, as many have been experiencing, is bogged down by the insecurity of its subject, it becomes unable to take new turns or shortcuts, and nothing comes out of it except a repetition of itself.

As a field of conversation Anthropology borders with other fields, such as the related social sciences, philosophy, mathematics, and such, in a fruitful though unclear conversation from whence it creates new concepts, new arguments for old or new questions. The point where two fields of conversation overlaps usually creates concepts that are important for both fields, being the moment when the concepts are experimented in all sorts of ways, thus creating new variations and serving as fresh material for the ongoing conversation. The field of conversation is where ideas are free floating, concepts are loose and fresh. As far as science is concerned, the purpose of the field of conversation is in the end to bring forth ideas to be integrated as new concepts into the conceptual framework of a particular theory. As we can easily recall, much of the structural concepts used in Anthropology derive from the fields of conversation of physics, mathematics, and biology.

Let us keep in mind these two sides of understanding how Anthropology works. The social science aspect is that which regulates the ideas that come out of the field of conversation. The present schools of Anthropology have drawn their concepts from a series of ideas that have been conversed and discussed and then made into more or less enclosed and self-regulating systems of explanation, proposition, and further researching. These ideas came out of the original doubts that were risen out of the common sense of Western cultures and nations; they in turn have been put forth for discussion and have consequently been transformed, accommodated, and regulated into theoretical systems. Along 250 years or so, that is, since the Enlightenment, one subject, Man, Homo Sapiens, and his extra-, trans-, or para-, biological body - that is, culture - in all its diversity and unity has been the main, practically the only, object of Anthropology. As in a polyhedric figure, this subject has been perceived in so many different ways as it was fit to be perceived and inasmuch as Western culture could fathom it. The following kinds of perceptions resulted in the subsequent kinds of conceptual frameworks or general theories:

1. Man (and culture) as a self-evident singular being in the cosmos, with conscience of



itself.

This kind of perception is what produced modern anthropology. It derives from the application of the principle of identity or self-identity as stated in the philosophy of Kant which was experiencing a resurgence in the latter quarter of the nineteenth century. The principle or the logic of identity states that  $A = A$  and  $A$  is different from  $A^-$ . It was this principle that inspired the likes of Franz Boas to elaborate his vision that culture is a self-contained, self-sufficient entity, different from any other, identified and made comprehensible only within its own terms. Nothing outside of it can explain it, let alone determine it.

Though philosophically based, in political-cultural terms this theoretical vision can be easily perceived as having been construed partially in defiance of the previous vision known as evolutionism which dominated the period, as if in a representation of the rising US (immigrant or first generation) middle class in opposition to the WASP establishment. The social and ethnic background of a good deal of the members of the so called Boasian school leaves little room for doubt. In great evidence were of course the Jews, whose religious worldview stresses the logic of self-identity, as can be seen by the belief in the identification of a people with one god outside of whom nothing is worthwhile.

Franz Boas left a great number of students and epigones who constituted the main proponents and propagandists of what modern anthropology should be as a social science. For a while it was so hegemonic that the whole field of conversation of anthropology in the United States was circumscribed to the themes and theoretical propositions raised within that school.

Boasianism, so to speak, is often times identified by the term "Historic Particularism". We believe the adjective is improper here on at least two counts. If we take history in a heraclitorean or hegelian sense, that is, as dialectics, where history is understood as the transformation in time of a certain situation to another situation by means of the negation of the previous situation, and where this negation is brought forth either by internal circumstances or exogenously by other influences and determinations, clearly this is not what any of the Boasians, including the most "historic" of them, Alfred Kroeber, ever conceived of history. Secondly, if we take history to be the passage in time of one situation to another as the unfolding of the potentials of the previous situation, as in the evolutionist theory of L. H.

2. *Boasian*

Morgan or in husserlian philosophy, that is also quite different from what Boasians ever dreamed of culture and history. Actually, what the Boasians thought of history is the random transformation in time of a situation as provoked by exogenous, accidental forces, with no aim, purpose, or teleology involved.

So, for Boasian Culture Particularism history as a structural element of culture is accidental; that is to say that some cultures may have, other may not even have history. But so is any and every possible determination outside of it, be it geographic, ecological, political, religious, or even such accidents as are provoked by the contact among cultures. Furthermore, culture is neither understandable by determinants within itself, such as the unconscious, the collective, the language structure, etc. Nothing explains culture except its functioning within itself. Anything else can be but accidental influences which can accidentally be construed by culture itself. That can also be seen in the detailed counter-arguments elaborated by Lowie against the evolutionary scheme and in the persistent view that culture has no or only very few "universals", that is, institutions whose purposes and integrity can be shared by all cultures. When analyzed in detail even very similar cross-cultural institutions would be explained away as different because they would perform different functions within each of their cultures. Even the incest taboo was placed on hold as a universal.

Among the eminent Boasians that followed this line of thinking with little variation are Robert Lowie, Alfred Kroeber, Margaret Mead, and Ruth Benedict. A few began to diverge from this orientation, notably, on one side, Edward Sapir, who introduced language as a determinant of culture, or as a paradigm of culture, and on the other side, Leslie White who was to rescue history (evolutionism), and Julian Steward who rescued ecology, as main determinants of culture. We will see about them in the next two sectors.

Elsewhere in Europe, where Anthropology was also going through similar changes (against the previous evolutionist paradigm), the dimension of self-identity helped develop the methodology and some of the principles of the variety of functionalism brought forth by Bronislaw Malinowski. He too argued that culture, and particularly cultural institutions, could only be explained by its own terms, that is, within the particular functionality of one's culture. He developed or elaborated, based partly on his personal experience, no doubt, but also conceptually, the idea that to understand a culture one would have to divest oneself of one's

culture identity and immerse oneself in the aimed culture in order to, through sharing identity, understand it. Culture comparisons here too would be impossible. However, Malinowski, worried about the sly accusations that Anthropology might not be considered a science, developed a conceptual scheme to compare cultures in order to obtain generalizations by using the notion of universal human (and animal, for that matter) needs. Every culture is then constrained within a system to fulfill human needs such as hunger, thirst, warmth, shelter, etc. The idea that there was some kind of system circling around culture, firming it under solid considerations was important to make it an object of science and comparison. Malinowski's scheme was easily criticized and rejected, but his ethnographic, i.e., self-identity dimension was followed up by many of his students and characterizes part of the anthropology practiced in Britain today. That variety of anthropology is added by a search for systematization, which is given by Functionalism in either empiricist, Comtean or Spencerian terms. The Boasians in their most radical manifestations came to exclude the idea that there was a system, though there was a holistic entity that could only be made understandable if perceived in its wholeness. The metaphor of culture as a patchwork quilt is quite illustrative of that feeling.

Alongside there is the figure of A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, whose jump from evolutionism to "structural functionalism" implied the recognition of the dimension of self-identity in culture. That you can find in his monographs on Oceanic peoples. His variety of functionalism asked for the concept of system or structure, but not as something given or predisposed, but something created by members of culture as they relate to one another. Words like aggregation, network, dyadic relations, etc., are typical of that sort of vision, quite clearly rooted in the English utilitarian tradition so dear to economic studies.

In sum, one can say that Americans and the British established the early varieties of the dimension of self-identity in Anthropology. They did so by negating the previous variety which is based on the dimension of history, the dialectical dimension. Under Boas the Americans stuck adamantly to the idea that culture is a self-made, self-consistent entity, and can only be understandable in its own terms. Neither history, nor systematic characters, nor any endogenous or exogenous factor determine the existence of culture per se. The stubborn character of this statement, against all evidence to the systematic character of culture that had been exposed by the previous anthropology, clearly denotes an ideological position of

affirmation of the value of the practitioners, the uprising American middle class (particularly of Jews). The British students of Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown also emphasized the self-identity dimension, as they were also fighting against the previous generation of evolutionists. But they were not socially affirming any new class and were disposed towards finding that self-made character of culture enveloped in some kind of system, however elusive or manipulative it be.

One thing is common to these varieties. The belief that substantively you cannot compare cultures because each is an entity in its own. If you cannot compare for purposes of obtaining knowledge, you cannot pass judgement either. Thus the philosophical concept of relativism that surged up in those years was borrowed and adopted into the anthropological system as a methodological and ethical construct called culture relativism.

*Do not compare*

**2. Man (and culture) as regulated by endogenous or exogenous forces generally constituted in structures: the individual, the social, the unconscious, the unconscious collective, the economy, language.**

At about the same time Americans and British modern anthropologists were fighting their wars to establish their new views of Man and culture, a new generation of French anthropologists were also working their way up under the leadership of Emile Durkheim. Durkheim and his disciples and colleagues gathered around the *Année Sociologique* did not wage battle against the evolutionists themselves who, in France, were offshoots of Comtean positivism, a scientific proposition with large and self-evident tints of ideology out of which one could hardly run or disregard. As a matter of fact, they generally took it for granted that cultures, or societies the concept they preferred to focus, evolve, as their propositions on the development of the division of labor and the passage from magic to science attest, though perhaps not as the evolutionists had posited.

Self-identity of a culture was a given to them as well as evolutionism or history, for indeed these two dimensions were incorporated in their theoretical vision through the concepts of static versus dynamic explicated in Comte as being basic dimensions of society (culture). However, they hardly ever paid much attention to these dimensions, particularly not to history. They were certainly not taking up any issue with Comtean positivism. They were

rather more interested in the invisible, the marginally visible, exotic, foreign, exceptional things in social life that might shed light upon the visible, routine, self-identical, but for them not yet quite clear, society (the static). That is why they became interested in the "primitive" as prime examples of how society and culture function in a basic, undisturbed level. Indeed their contribution to the anthropological field of conversation was to ask about that which is not wholly perceivable, the underlying constraints that determine the empirically visible. They, in other words, asked about the reasons for essence, much as the Greeks asked the basic question about being. In philosophical and logical terms, that questions constitutes the dimension of otherness, or alterity, the dimension that asks about the self, the being, the self-identity. To make visible such a dimension the previous dimension of self-evidence needs to be taken for granted.

The basic question Durkheimian anthropology asked was what determines society (culture, cultural institutions), and the answer that came out along some fifty years of discussion and elaboration of analysis based on ethnographical material was "an invisible structure" that can only be perceived by a conception drawn out of a scientific method. What is the cause of suicide, that seemingly utmost individually oriented of tragic human acts? It is a systematic series of unperceived events found in social life that force the individual to do it unawares and practically independent of his will.

When asked about what makes man and culture function, think, exist, the answer was the collective consciousness. For most empirically oriented, culture particularist anthropologists of British and American attraction, such an entity was considered unverifiable by scientific means, therefore a bogus. Nevertheless Radcliffe-Brown and his followers claimed to have been inspired by Durkheim and called their variety of functionalism "structural". That happened so because they practically stuck to the declared propositions found in Durkheim's *The Rules of the Sociological Method*, that most devious scientific proposition, where Durkheim asserts that that his was an empirical science, with an inductive methodology in which events should be taken as facts, human facts, and that facts could only be answered by other facts of a different order. How the collective consciousness could be conceived and analyzed as an empirical fact discovered by induction was certainly ignored by Durkheim's British sympathizers. They also made a point to disregard Durkheim's major

work on religion as well as the brilliant works of Marcel Mauss, Arnold Von Gennep, Hubert, Robert Hertz, and even the somewhat marginalized Claude Levy-Bruhl. The questions raised and the answers given by these works are all beyond the empirical, self-identity dimension of British and American anthropology of those times.

Society can be explained by the collective consciousness, an invisible structure that can only be conceived by the scientist through the representations that emanate from it and that it emanates. Other cultural or social institutions and events can only be explained by the invisible structures that form it. Magic is efficacious for those that belief in it (dimension of self-identity) because it is performed under the rule of a structure that is unconsciously perceived by the practitioners (dimension of otherness). Ritual is an institution that deals with empirical events and it is conceived by a structure that orders and regulates its disposition.

Alongside Durkheim and his school there rose on the French intellectual scene the brilliant figure of Saussure and his theory of language as an invisible structure that regulates language, that most precious of human event, fact, institution, or tool. The complementary concepts of *parole* and *langue* echoed the individual and the collective in similar if not equivalent proportion. *Langue* is what determines the possibilities of the *parole*. One cannot overemphasize the importance of that proposition for the development of the study of language and for ongoing interpretation of culture by means of the dimension of otherness.

In the United States Edward Sapir, who had been a student of Boas, developed, together with Whorff, the so called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Here not only language is determined by an internal structure, but culture, which is the totality where language resides as one of its part, is determined by the structure of language. Culture can not only be understood as the manifestation of language as it produces concepts but also as how these concepts are structured.

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Cultural ecology, Sapir-Whorff, Lévi-Straussian Structuralism (theory of myths). Kroeber, Cognitive Anthropology. Theory of the primitive. Sahlins and his theory of culture and history. Geertz.

3. Man (and culture) as the product of his own determination which is the result of his past, but also involved with forces that are not controllable. Man in movement, man in history.. Evolutionism: Morgan, Marx; French Marxism; Diffusionism; Multievolutionism: Steward. Levi-Strauss: Science of the Concrete.

4. Man (and culture) as part of a system created by himself, controllable, measurable, cognizant of changes, historic, but caught in a mire of determinations; in short, scientific.

Levi-Strauss: theory of kinship; Pragmatic (?) Anthropology breaking down and leading to Anthropology of Double-Doubt.

Next step: write two or three pages about each of these.

Next step: present the critique of all of these

Next step: present the basis by which an Ontosystemic Anthropology will subsume the important parts of each and will evolve towards inserting the individual as a sensible being with purpose into the picture.

### **Ontosystemic Anthropology**

Ontosystemic Anthropology takes man and culture - and for that matter any event or institution derived thereof - to be composed of five dimensions all integrated to form one complete entity. These five dimensions are:

1. The dimension of self-integrity. That means that man (and culture and every event or institution) is a self-integrated entity and forms a whole in and of itself. It is self-evident, visible, and comprehensible. Anything that is outside of it does not belong to it. This is the dimension that best represents the individual. It stands as one against the rest. It stands in its own terms and is explainable by its own terms. It has an identity and produces feelings of identity to its parts or members, and these feelings exclude all non-members. In anthropological theory this dimension can best be perceived as the basis of Boasian Particularism, with its varieties (Lowie, Kroeber, and Benedict). It forms the basis upon which English functionalism and French Positivism. In philosophy this dimension is



associated with the logic of identity, to Parmenides, Kant and its modern varieties.

2. The dimension of otherness or alterity. That means that man, culture or any event whatsoever is partly produced or explainable by something other than itself, or something within itself but not clearly visible and comprehensible. The dimension of otherness functions as the opposite of the dimension of self-identity. This dimension has not until recently been given proper acknowledgement even by philosophy due to its obscurity. Only when realized as a system or structure does it become comprehensible. For instance, the dimension of otherness in language became understandable only when the phoneme as a structure within a structure was formulated. Because of the difficulty in making this dimension clear, the discovery of elements thereof has been vaguely acknowledged by many as the virtuality of science. The unconscious is an example of the dimension of otherness in man. The discovery of the unconscious by Freud was hailed as one of the most important steps for a science of man. Durkheim proposed the collective unconscious as the principle dimension of otherness in culture. In fact, as we examine the propositions of Durkheim we realize that the dimension of otherness is what organizes culture as a collectivity. Thus this dimension relates to the recognition of the self-identity of others. It creates the basis for the establishment of society. Much of anthropology attributes to several eidetic facts, institutions, and events of this dimension the principal organizers of (collective) culture behavior. In short, we can say that the dimension of otherness in society is collectivity; in man it is the unconscious. Thus one can say that French Durkheimian (i.e., pre-Lévi-strauss) functionalism is the epitome of the dimension of otherness.

In addition to being within the self, the dimension of otherness can be something outside the self. Thus the environment is usually seen as an otherness of man, in fact the otherness of any living being (itself being formed by living beings as well). This otherness integrates man within itself and man becomes the result of his action within the environment. The interplay of man and the environment - which can be extended to anything outside man, especially collectivity, the social - is one of the actions that creates the following dimension.


3. The dimension of movement, change, history - the dialectical dimension. Every event (man) functions in a time dimension. One can apprehend this dimension as a movement from one point to another, from one point and then back to itself, as in the life cycle; or as

having a forward direction as in the unfolding of a potential, or even as having no perceived direction. All the same there is movement and consequently change. This is the dimension first recognized in Greek philosophy by Heraclitus. Movement occurs in time and is motivated by the interplay of the dimensions of self-identity and otherness. In Plato and later in Hegel this dimension is called dialectic. It represents movement as the upshot of the confrontation of the one with its otherness, whatever that otherness be. Hegelianism, then Marxism is the most prominent school of thinking that emphasizes this dimension as the most significant for comprehending man. This dimension recognizes implicitly the previous two, self-identity and otherness, but it sees them as part of itself, not also as independent dimensions alongside itself. Thus it often times rejects the previous dimensions when it would be more proper to acknowledge them as part of itself and also as entities in their own right. For instance, some forms of orthodox Marxism rejects the unconscious (otherness) and frequently rejects the individual (self-identity).

4. The systemic dimension. This is the dimension in which the event (man) is integrated in all related events and becomes part of a recognized whole. It is in this whole that it makes sense, that it is comprehensible. This dimension is what produces systematic knowledge, that is, science. So every science, including human sciences, is based on the systemic dimension. In philosophy the logic behind this dimension is known as classic Aristotelian logic, or logic of the third excluded. That is, events (man, culture) are made comprehensible when incorporated into a self-contained system that defines the terms of the integration of these things, and excludes anything else that cannot be part of the system. This dimension carries within itself the other three dimensions without necessarily recognizing each one of them. The problem is that it is not self-conscious and, as with the other dimensions, it has a tendency toward self-reification. In Anthropology, French Lévi-Straussian Structuralism, as proposed by the author in his theoretical papers (but not necessarily in his analytical books, such as the Elementary Structures of Kinship), is based on the systemic dimension, with an unconscious emphasis on the dimension of otherness, for being descendent of Durkheimian Functionalism<sup>2</sup>. Epigones of Lévi-Strauss, such as Sahlins, follow suit; while other creative thinkers as Geertz emphasize within the systemic dimension the self-identity dimension; and Godelier emphasizes the dialectic dimension. Nevertheless

they all converge to the idea that man or the event is accountable by and within the system only, in which system he is completely involved and enveloped. Though man is taken to be self-conscious he is entrapped in the system and can only have meaning within it. When change occurs, it is interpreted as the result of the misarticulations of the structure which is by definition unstable, not as the independent interplay of the two basic dimensions within the dialectic dimension. This is easily seen in the mishandling of the notions of change and history in Lévi-Straussian Structuralism, as has been pointed out by many of his critics.

5. The ontosystemic dimension. This dimension subsumes the previous ones but at the same time it is conscious of itself and of the other dimensions all in their own right. This self-consciousness can be comprehended in the most general terms by focusing in the notion of purpose or self-conscious direction. Man or the event at one point or another can be self-conscious of the system in which he is involved because there is more to him than the system. This dimension was first recognized and proposed by the philosopher Luiz Sergio Coelho de Sampaio<sup>3</sup>. It represents the integrity in man as a self-conscious, historical, structural being that has a purpose in the world. In a more general and philosophical manner, this dimension is integrated with the theory of the anthropic principle and thus has correlation with the theory of physics<sup>4</sup>.



1. Following the Jewish-Czech-German-Brazilian philosopher Vilém Flusser, if doubting is the basic function of the intellect, doubting of doubting leads to the impossibility of knowledge, to the place of sheer power. See Flusser, *A dúvida* (Rio de Janeiro: Relumê-Dumará, 1999).

2. Paul Ricoeur in his article "L'herméneutique et le structuralisme" in *Esprit*, November 1963, p. 637, says that Structuralism is "a Kantism without a transcendental subject." As a matter of fact it would be more proper to say that it is science with an unconscious subject.

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3. See Sampaio's "Notas para uma Antropo-logia" in Sampaio *Lógica Ressuscitada*. Rio de Janeiro: EdUERJ, 2000.

4. See Sampaio, "O princípio antrópico" in Sampaio ...

